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This note examines the recent change to the Internal Revenue Service’s 
(IRS) whistleblower program. Whistleblowers receive a percentage of the 
proceeds collected as a result of an action or settlement. In 2018, Congress 
expanded the definition of the proceeds collected to include criminal fines, 
civil forfeitures, and penalties arising out of the violations of reporting 
requirements. Prior to this change, the IRS asserted that criminal fines and 
civil forfeitures did not constitute “collected proceeds.” Analyzing the 
judicial and legislative history, along with empirical data reported by the 
IRS, this note specifically addresses whether the change in the definition of 
proceeds advances the objectives of the tax whistleblower program and 




“It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one 
bad one to lose it.”1 These famous words by Benjamin Franklin resonate with 
employees who blow the whistle and employers who engage in deceptive 
activities. In 1772, when Franklin exposed letters promoting abridgement of 
colonists’ rights from then-governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson, 
’unbeknownst to him, he became the first ever American Whistleblower.2 
His conduct opened the floodgates for major political and economic scandals 
in the nation. The Watergate scandal, the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and the 
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Judiciary, 4 J. COMPARATIVE L. 228, 228 (2009). 
 2. Anthony F. Fata & David E. Kovel, The New Regulatory and Self-Policing Paradigm: 
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recent global surveillance disclosures are some of the most shocking 
revelations that come to mind. 
Referred to as rats, villains, snitches, and occasionally heroes, 
whistleblowers tend to believe that public interest outweighs professional 
duties and “blow the whistle” on fraudulent activities.3 Most whistleblowers 
are employees who report misconduct believing that it is the right action to 
take, it will correct a wrong, or it will support co-workers.4 These individuals 
are usually at the core of the business.5 They possess the specific and 
necessary knowledge to enable the commencement of an enforcement action 
against fraudulent businesses.6 To put this into perspective, consider the 
following scenario: 
Sam is a bookkeeper. She discovers that her employer, Jack, 
is engaged in embezzlement, false recordkeeping, and is 
hiding assets overseas. Jack owns a multi-million dollar 
business that engages in domestic and foreign transactions. 
Sam is not involved in these fraudulent activities. After 
pondering over this revelation for several days, she decides 
to tip off the IRS and discloses information about Jack’s 
suspicious activities. She mails copies of his fabricated bank 
statements and recordkeeping documents to the IRS. But, in 
the interim, she continues to work for him as a bookkeeper. 
While most will call Sam a snitch, others might admire her for risking her 
career for social welfare. If Sam’s allegations are credible, she might become 
a recipient of a whistleblower award paid out of the proceeds that the IRS 
collects from Jack. But how big should Sam’s award be? And more 
specifically, what should count as “proceeds” for purposes of determining 
the size of Sam’s whistleblower award? 
Before 2018, the IRS asserted that only the proceeds collected under 
Title 26, which focuses on the violations of federal tax laws, may be used to 
calculate a whistleblower’s award.7 Criminal fines and civil forfeitures were 
 
 3. Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts 
Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of 
Employers, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 316 (1993); see also RALPH NADER ET 
AL., WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
VII (1972). 
 4. ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER, INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY (2012), 
http://www.corporatecompliance-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/inside-the-
mind-of-a-whistleblower-NBES.pdf. 
 5. Fata & Kovel, supra note 2, at 38. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 121, 126 (2016) [hereinafter 
Whistleblower II]. 
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not considered collected proceeds for the awards paid under Title 26.8 Civil 
forfeitures are enforced on property used for illegal purposes, while criminal 
fines are enforced against the taxpayer for engaging in fraudulent conduct.9 
The IRS claimed that including criminal fines and civil forfeitures under 
Title 26 would conflict with Title 31 and Title 18.10 While Title 26 codifies 
federal tax laws, such as income, estate, excise, gift, tobacco, employment, 
and alcohol taxes, Title 31 codifies anti-money laundering laws and Title 18 
relates to crimes and criminal procedure.11 However, after Congress changed 
the law in 2018, the IRS started to include both Title 26 and non-Title 26 
criminal fines and civil forfeitures in the proceeds collected for the purposes 
of determining a whistleblower’s award. 
In the above hypothetical, Sam’s award will be paid out of the total 
proceeds that the IRS will collect from Jack. These proceeds will include 
Jack’s penalty for the underpayment of tax, along with a criminal fine for the 
tax deficiency that resulted from his fraudulent conduct.12 It will also include 
civil forfeitures with respect to any property that was used to commit the 
illegal activities.13 Pre-2018, Sam would have received an award calculated 
based on the penalty for the underpayment of tax per Title 26 (i.e., excluding 
non-Title 26 criminal fines and civil forfeitures). Now, post-2018, her award 
will be a portion of the total proceeds (i.e., including criminal fines and civil 
forfeitures). This raises a question: does the post-2018 broadened definition 
of proceeds collected, including criminal fines and civil forfeitures under 
both Title 26 and non-Title 26, increase the efficacy of the IRS whistleblower 
program and advance good tax policy? 
By increasing the sum of awards paid out to whistleblowers, the 
broad interpretation of proceeds encourages more whistleblowers to disclose 
information about noncompliance. This facilitates the IRS enforcement 
efforts in detecting noncompliant taxpayers, thereby closing the tax gap and 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text. 
 10. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 126. 
 11. United States Census Bureau, TITLE 26, U.S. CODE, CENSUS.GOV,  (Dec. 17, 2019),  
https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/privacy_confidentiality/title_26_us_code_1.
html [https://perma.cc/3UQ4-UGMH]; IRS, TITLE 31 ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, IRS.GOV 
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/indian-tribal-governments/title-31-
anti-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/PTR2-YET9]; U.S. Gov’t Publishing Office, 18 
U.S.C., GOVINFO.GOV (2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2009-
title18/html/USCODE-2009-title18.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3DW-8QCY]. 
 12. Internal Revenue Service, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALS PART 9, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 
13, IRS.GOV, (2009), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-013 [https://perma.cc/FE6S-
MB8X]. 
 13. Internal Revenue Service, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALS PART 9, CHAPTER 7, SECTION 
2, IRS.GOV, (2012), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-007-002 [https://perma.cc/V7RE-
WLBG]. 
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increasing the revenues collected. However, the broad definition of proceeds 
does not entirely incentivize individuals with heterogeneous motivations to 
disclose information or encourage companies to implement effective internal 
reporting mechanisms. To resolve the former issue, the IRS should educate 
the public about the benefits of the whistleblower program and publicly 
praise whistleblowers as heroes. To address the latter issue, the IRS should 
impose penalties on companies with inadequate internal reporting 
mechanisms. Fear of legal penalties and negative publicity will prompt these 
companies to investigate and rectify tax-related violations. 
Part I of this article examines the emergence of whistleblower 
programs in general before specifically discussing the IRS whistleblower 
program. To better understand the policy implications of recent amendments 
to the IRS whistleblower statute, it is essential to consider the origins of the 
program, along with the changes in the legislative and judicial history of the 
program. Part II then analyzes whether the broad definition of proceeds 
advances the objective of the tax whistleblower program and discusses the 
policy implications, more generally, of the broadened definition of proceeds. 
Part III discusses problems that cannot be resolved by the expanded 
definition of proceeds. 
II. THE TAX WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
Whistleblower programs are weapons that are built on the principle 
that “if you know something, say something.”14 Today, these programs 
incentivize individuals to come forth with any information they might have 
on wrongdoings committed by those in their professional or personal circle. 
For instance, in response to the stock market collapse in 2010, Congress 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act) adding the Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protection section to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) whistleblowers are awarded somewhere 
between ten to thirty percent of the total monetary sanctions that are collected 
by the Commission depending on the significance of information, degree of 
assistance by the whistleblower, and the Commission’s interest in deterring 
the violation.16 The SEC established the whistleblower program to encourage 
individuals to report high-quality tips and assist the Commission in detecting 
 
 14. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123–24. 
 15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); Michael H. Hurwitz & Jonathan 
Kovacs, An Overview of the SEC’s Whistleblower Award Program, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 531, 533 (2016). 
 16. Id. at 535. 
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any wrongdoing.17 Similar programs have been established by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), and Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).18 
The main purpose of whistleblower programs is to “enlist private 
interests into the fight against serious threats to the U.S. economy.”19 By 
merging economic incentives with protective measures against retaliation, 
these programs foster an environment that encourages individuals with 
knowledge of fraudulent activities to come forward without having to report 
violations to their employer’s internal compliance system.20 These 
safeguards also protect persons other than employees, such as clients, 
competitors, and investors, who may disclose illegal activities.21 In addition 
to deterring illegal activities and exposing otherwise concealed violations, 
this external reporting to whistleblower programs has the potential to 
improve self-reporting done by organizations themselves.22 To prevent 
whistleblowers from “blowing the whistle” on their misconduct, companies 
are likely to feel pressured to voluntarily disclose their activities.23 
Whistleblowers reduce regulatory costs by encouraging legal compliance.24 
Because financial activities that have increasingly been taking place are 
beyond regulators’ expertise, whistleblowers help regulators to anticipate 
and detect any financial misconduct.25 
One of the most prominent whistleblower programs was established 
by the IRS. The following sections examine the IRS whistleblower program, 
 
 17. United States SEC, SEC PROPOSES WHISTLEBLOWER RULE AMENDMENTS, SEC.GOV, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-120 [https://perma.cc/G7VY-8S7M]. 
 18. See, e.g., United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC LAUNCHES 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM’S WEBSITE, CFTC.GOV, 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7312-16 [https://perma.cc/9YYZ-JQQQ]; 
Richard E. Condit, Providing Environmental Whistleblowers with Twenty-First Century 
Protections, 2 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 31, 55–56 (2011). 
 19. Christopher K. Warren, Blowing the Whistle on Environmental Law: How Congress 
Can Help the EPA Enlist Private Resources in the Fight to Save the Planet, 40 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 195, 197 (2015). 
 20. Warren, supra note 19, at 197; Joel Androphy & Kathryn Nelson, The Intersection of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: What All Practitioners, 
Whistleblowers, Defendants, and Corporations Need to Know, in 59 THE ADVOCATE: 
LITIGATION SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS 19, 24 (Lonny Hoffman ed., 2012). 
 21. Warren, supra note 19, at 198–205. 
 22. Amy Deen Westbrook, Cash for Your Conscience: Do Whistleblower Incentives 
Improve Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 75 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1097, 
1106 (2018). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
861, 867, 879–80 (2016). 
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which has become a substantial source of revenue for the federal 
government. Section A looks at the origins of the tax whistleblower laws. 
Section B provides a brief description of the claim filing process. Section C 
analyzes the growth of the program based on the proceeds collected and the 
amounts awarded. Section D focuses on the different interpretations of the 
term “proceeds” over the past few decades. 
A. Tax Whistleblower Statutes 
The tax whistleblower program was established to reward 
individuals who inform on taxpayers engaged in tax fraud. The primary 
purpose of this program is to reduce the tax gap and adequately motivate 
whistleblowers to disclose information.26 The IRS defines a whistleblower 
as an “individual who provides information to the [agency] regarding 
violations of the tax laws or related statutes and submits a claim for an award 
under Section 7623 with respect to the information.”27 These whistleblowers 
have emerged as an important tool for the IRS.28 The IRS has attempted to 
implement technological mechanisms to detect fraudulent returns.29 
However, due to the immense pressure to increase revenue and “administer 
new tax credits with fewer resources,” the IRS has to rely on “enforcement 
personnel and information leverage.”30 A whistleblower acts as a substitute 
for “enforcement personnel by identifying wrongdoing and by providing a 
roadmap for prosecution.”31 Thus, the IRS employs its whistleblower 
program as a tool to deter tax fraud in a cost-effective manner.32 
The following parts explain the development in the tax 
whistleblower statute in a chronological manner. Part 1 describes the original 
tax whistleblower statute. Part 2 examines the provision that was added to 
further enhance the whistleblower program. 
1. Establishment of the Tax Whistleblower Law 
The tax whistleblower statute, IRC section 7623(a), dates back to 
1867.33 This original provision permitted the Secretary to award sums as 
 
 26. Stephen W. Carman, More Cheese for the Rats: Tax Court and Congress Give Big Win 
to Whistleblowers with Broad Definition of Proceeds, 83 MO. L. REV. 155, 169 (2018). 
 27. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (2011). 
 28. Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah J. Webber, Lost Opportunities: The Underuse of Tax 
Whistleblowers, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 321, 326 (2015). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 324, 326. 
 31. Id. at 327. 
 32. Yehonatan Givati, Of Snitches and Riches: Optimal IRS and SEC Whistleblower 
Rewards, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 123 (2017). 
 33. IRS, History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/history-of-the-whilstleblower-informant-program; Jay 
Nanavati, The IRS Whistleblower Regulations: A Hindrance to Tax Enforcement, THE CPA J. 
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deemed necessary “for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment 
persons guilty of violating the internal revenues or conniving at the same.”34 
The only change to this law since 1867 has been the addition of another 
clause, allowing awards to be distributed specifically for “detecting 
underpayments of tax,” in 1996.35 The IRS originally made payments out of 
its appropriated funds; however, after the 1996 amendments, the source of 
funds was changed to the “proceeds collected from the taxpayer.”36 Issuance 
of awards was completely discretionary prior to the 2006 amendments.37 The 
awards were calculated based on the contribution of the whistleblower’s 
information to the collection of proceeds.38 Awards were generally one, ten, 
or fifteen percent of the total proceeds, not exceeding $10 million.39 
2. Mandatory Award for Disclosures 
As part of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act in 2006, Congress 
added the IRC section 7623(b), which required the IRS to award “at least 15 
percent but not more than 30 percent of the proceeds collected as a result of 
the action (including any related actions40)” if an individual “substantially” 
contributed to the collection of “tax, penalties, interest, and other amounts” 
when the proceeds in dispute exceed $2 million.41 This provision applies to 
any action against a taxpayer, including any individual with gross income of 
more than $200,000 for the taxable years subject to the action.42 Awards are 
mandatory if these conditions are met. Whistleblowers who do not qualify 
for the IRC section 7623(b) may still be eligible for an award under Section 
 
(Dec. 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/12/18/the-irs-whistleblower-regulations/ 
(discussing how the original creation of tax whistleblower statute about 153 years ago was 
codified and added to the Internal Revenue Code as section 7623(a)). 
 34. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019); IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblower_annual_report.pdf. 
 35. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 
1473 (1996). 
 36. IRS, Whistleblower Program First Report to Congress 2 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See infra note 104. The proposed regulations limited “related action” to a 
subsequent/second action against the person identified in the original information. An action 
against any other person is permitted if the other person is directly related to the person 
identified in the information, facts relate to the tax underpayments or the IRC violations that 
are similar to those described in the information, and the IRS has initiated an action against 
the other person based on facts provided. 
 41. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2019); IRS, Whistleblower Program First Report to Congress 2 
(2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf. 
 42. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2019). 
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7623(a).43 Nevertheless, Congress added the new provision because the 
whistleblower program was underused “due to administrative problems and 
inadequate incentives for whistleblowers.”44 The whistleblower program 
was considered to be capable of producing more revenue. This new provision 
became applicable to whistleblower claims filed after the enactment date of 
December 20, 2006.45 The enactment of Section 7623(b) has altered the 
whistleblower claims process as discussed in the following section. 
B. Filing a Tax Whistleblower Claim with the IRS 
The IRC section 7623(b) was enacted to encourage more 
whistleblowers to file claims. However, prior to filing a claim, an informant 
needs to be aware of certain requirements. Informants, also known as 
claimants, must disclose their identities; anonymous claims are not 
processed.46 The claim must be filed by a person who is actually an 
individual, not a corporation or partnership.47 A claim filed by an individual 
who is an employee of the federal, state or local government, or who is 
required by law to disclose information is not processed under the IRC 
sections 7623(a) and 7623(b).48 These individuals, along with any business 
entities, are not eligible for whistleblower tax awards.49 Most importantly, 
claims without specific and credible information are deemed meritless and 
are denied.50 
To file a tax whistleblower claim, an individual must first submit the 
IRS Form 211 (“Application for Award for Original Information”) to the IRS 
Whistleblower Office (WO).51 This form is separated into two sections. 
Section A asks questions about the taxpayer subject to the whistleblower 
claim (name, address, identification number, date of birth, etc.), type of 
unpaid tax, description of alleged violation, how the claimant learned of the 
violation, and an estimate of tax owed.52 Section B requests information 
 
 43. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019). 
 44. Carman, supra note 26, at 159. 
 45. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 (2006); 
IRS, IRC 7623(b) (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/compliance/internal-revenue-code-
irc-7623b. 
 46. IRS, How do you File a Whistleblower Award Claim Under Section 7623(a) or (b) 
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/compliance/how-do-you-file-a-whistleblower-award-
claim-under-section-7623-a-or-b. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Form 211, Application for Award for Original Information, 1 (2018). 
 52. Form 211, Instructions for Form 211, Application for Award for Original Information, 
2 (2018). 
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about the claimant (name, address, date of birth, social security number, etc.) 
and requires the claimant to sign under the penalty of perjury.53 
The initial phase of the claim process can be divided into two steps. 
First, the WO’s Initial Claim Evaluation unit examines the claims for 
completion and submits the information into a management information 
system known as E-Trak.54 Claims that are purely speculative with no 
specific or credible issues, are ineligible for an award, or are missing 
information are rejected.55 The WO conducts this initial review within thirty 
to ninety days.56 The IRC section 7623(b) claims that are rejected have an 
administrative proceeding and can be petitioned to the tax court.57 Second, 
the WO routes claims warranting further review to the appropriate operating 
division (OD) – Large Business and International, Small Business/Self-
Employed, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, or Criminal 
Investigation.58 The OD subject matter expert (SME) evaluates the claim and 
determines its potential for an IRS action.59 If the OD SME determines the 
claim to be an IRC section 7623(b) claim with more than $2 million of 
proceeds in dispute, then it is assigned to the Case Development and 
Oversight unit for review.60 These review steps are designed to be completed 
in ninety days, but only about sixty-seven percent of the IRC section 7623(b) 
claims are processed during this period.61 Once the claim has been selected 
for an audit or an enforcement proceeding (i.e., a collections action or a 
criminal investigation), it moves to the field examination and appeals phase 
that may lag over several years.62 During this period, whistleblowers may be 
interviewed once by the IRS, but other than that interaction, they will not 
receive any information about the investigation until a decision has been 
made about the claim.63 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-20, IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: 
BILLIONS COLLECTED, BUT TIMELINESS AND COMMUNICATION CONCERNS MAY DISCOURAGE 
WHISTLEBLOWERS 8 (2015) (noting that the E-Trak follows the progress of claims throughout 
the review process) [hereinafter GAO-16-20]. 
 55. IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf.; GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 8. 
 56. IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.; see also GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 3, 8–10. 
 59. GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 10. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
 61. Id. at 9. 
 62. Id. at 10; IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf. 
 63. IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf. 
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After the examination and appeals period is over, the WO 
determines the award percentage based on the information contributed by the 
whistleblower.64 The minimum award is set at fifteen percent, and the WO 
uses positive factors to decide whether the award percentage should be 
raised, with the maximum set at thirty percent.65 Positive factors may include 
the whistleblower’s promptness in informing the IRS, clarity of facts, and 
originality of the claim.66 However, the WO also considers negative factors, 
such as delay in reaching out to the IRS, violation of any confidentiality 
agreement with the IRS, and conveyance of misleading information, to 
determine whether the award should be decreased.67 If the whistleblower was 
involved in the malfeasance that led to the underpayment of tax or was not 
the original source of specific allegations, then the maximum percentage of 
the award is ten percent.68 An individual is not the original source of specific 
allegations if they arise from an earlier administrative or judicial hearing, 
government audit, report, hearing or investigation, or news.69 Moreover, the 
WO must deny an award to a claimant who is criminally convicted for 
initiating actions that led to the underpayment of tax or another violation of 
IRS laws.70 
Once the right to appeal for the taxpayer against whom the whistle 
was blown (targeted taxpayer) expires, the collected proceeds are finalized, 
and the WO applies the calculated percentage to collected proceeds.71 Upon 
the receipt of this preliminary award, a whistleblower has the option to 
appeal if there is any disagreement over the amount awarded.72 If the targeted 
taxpayer does not pay the enforced fines and penalties, the WO has to wait 
for the ten-year collection statute to expire before making any other decision 
about the award.73 If the taxpayer does not make any payment, the 
whistleblower receives no award.74 
 
 
 64. GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 10. 
 65. Id. at 25. 
 66. Bryan C. Skarlatos & Joseph Septimus, New Proposed Regulations Flesh Out IRS 
Whistleblower Program, 14 J. TAX PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 21, 23 (2012). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(2)(A) (2019); GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 25; IRS, 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FIRST REPORT TO CONGRESS 3–4 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf. 
 69. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(2)(A) (2019). 
 70. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(3) (2019). 
 71. GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 14. 
 72. Id. 
 73. IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251 (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf. 
 74. Id. 
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C. Growth of Tax Whistleblower Awards 
The WO’s claims process spans over many years, with no guarantee 
of an award. Yet, with the implementation of the IRC section 7623(b) in 
2006, submissions from whistleblowers started “almost immediately” and 
2007 became a year of transition for the whistleblower program.75 Although 
data regarding the whistleblower claims that “would have qualified for the 
mandatory awards” under Section 7623(b) prior to its enactment are 
unavailable, “initial results suggest that whistleblowers with significant 
knowledge were coming forward as a result of the changes to the award 
program.”76 
The following table reflects the amount of proceeds collected and 
amount of proceeds paid as awards over the past sixteen years.77 The awards 
paid out in the earlier Fiscal Years (FY) 2007 through 2010 were based on 
the IRC section 7623(a) with lower percentages.78 The IRS does not issue 
awards until the targeted taxpayer exhausts “all appeal rights and the 
statutory period for the filling of a claim for refund” expires.79 Due to this 
delay in the process, the awards under Section 7623(b) were not paid until 
FY 2011.80 Even then, most of the awards paid were from claims filed under 
Section 7623(a). Note Section 7623(b) only applies to claims that were filed 







 75. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FIRST REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf. Note section 406(c) of Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Congress on the 
use of Section 7623 annually. 
 76. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2009.pdf. 
 77. Id. at 10; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
17 (2012),  https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2013.pdf; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM FY 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 11 (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2016.pdf; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 
2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 10 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241-
-2017.pdf; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 8 
(2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2020.pdf. 
 78. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 15 
(2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2012.pdf. 
 79. Id. at 1. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Amount of Awards Paid 
2004 259 $74,130,794 $4,585,143 
2005 169 $93,677,606 $7,602,685 
2006 220 $258,590,435 $24,184,458 
2007 227 $181,784,287 $13,600,205 
2008 198 $155,985,834 $22,370,756 
2009 110 $206,032,872 $5,851,608 
2010 97 $464,695,459 $18,746,327 
2011 97 $48,047,500 $8,008,430 
2012 128 $592,498,294 $125,355,799 
2013 133 $343,674,315 $54,054,587 
2014 101 $309,990,568 $52,281,628 
2015 99 $501,317,481 $103,486,677 
2016 418 $368,907,298 $61,390,910 
2017 242 $190,583,750 $33,979,873 
2018 217 $1,441,255,859 $312,207,590 
2019 181 $616,773,127 $120,305,278 
*The IRS generally does not complete the claim process in the same 
year it was filed; there is no correlation between the claim 
submission year and the award paid year.83 For example, hundreds 
of claims filed in 2007 are still open.84 
The 2006 legislative change was not the only change to Section 
7623(b) during the years listed in Table 1. As will be discussed later in Part 
I.D.2, Congress enacted another change in 2018, and the 2018 change 
expanded the definition of the term “proceeds” for purposes of determining 
the amount of whistleblower awards.85  Table 1 does not, however, fully 
capture the impact of that change because, as discussed above, awards are 
not paid out in the same year that claims are filed.86 Table 2 below does not 
indicate any significant increase in the total claim submissions over the past 
 
   82 See sources cited supra note 77. 
 83. See infra Part II.B on the claims process. 
 84. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 15 (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2020.pdf. 
 85. See infra note 123. 
 86. See infra Part II.B on the claims process. 
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few years.87 There is an incremental change of 3.25 percent from 2017 to 
2018 followed by a decline of 3.43 percent in 2019 with respect to claim 
submissions. Notwithstanding any political or economic changes, the 
fluctuating data demonstrate that the new definition of proceeds may not 
have incentivized claimants (any more than usual) to file a claim. On the 
other hand, the changes made to the definition of proceeds apply to 
information with respect to any claim for which a final determination of 
award has not been made before February 9, 2018,88 therefore, the awards 
paid out in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 reflect the inclusion of criminal fines 
and civil forfeitures in proceeds collected. Even though the number of 
awards paid have decreased to 217 and 181 during their respective fiscal 
years, 2018 and 2019, the amount of proceeds paid out in awards has 
increased, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, the broader definition of proceeds 
has increased the awards paid out in the most recent fiscal years. 
Table 2: Fiscal Years 2017-2019 Claim Submissions89 






2017 4,157 271 4,428 
2018 4,188 384 4,572 
2019 4,046 369 4,415 
*If a claim does not meet the IRC section 7623(b) requirements, the 
WO can review it for an award under the discretionary standard of 
the IRC section 7623(a).90 
Another reason why the amounts collected and amounts paid only 
reflected taxes, penalties, interests and additional amounts collected based 
on the whistleblower information91 prior to 2018 was the Victims of Crime 
Act that required all the criminal fines to be deposited into the Victims of 
Crime Fund.92 In 2018, the non-Title 26 amounts collected for criminal fines, 
 
 87. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER 
OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER 
OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports. 
 88. See infra note 124. 
   89.  See sources cited supra note 87.  
 90. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports. 
 91. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 14 (2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports. 
 92. 28 C.F.R. § 94 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIME VICTIMS FUND, 
https://www.ovc.gov/about/victimsfund.html. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 established 
the Crime Victims Fund that is funded by the penalties, criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds, 
and special assessments collected from federal offenders. In 1993, the initial cap on how much 
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civil forfeitures, and violations of reporting requirements added up to 
$809,915,922, while the amounts collected under Title 26 was 
$631,339,937.93 In 2019, the non-Title 26 amounts collected were much 
lower at about $110,003,100, while the Title 26 amounts constituted a much 
higher percentage of the total amounts collected at $506,770,027.94 The 
addition of non-Title 26 criminal fines and civil forfeitures to collected 
proceeds validates the assumption that the broad definition of “proceeds” 
significantly impacts the amounts collected and amounts paid for claims that 
were not finalized prior to 2018. 
D. What Does “Proceeds” Mean? 
The monetary award is a major component of the tax whistleblower 
policy. Therefore, the following section traces the developments in how 
“proceeds collected” has been defined for purposes of determining the 
amount of whistleblower awards. 
1. Initial Changes to the Definition of “Proceeds Collected” 
As explained above in Part I.A.2, Congress’s Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights 2, which was passed in 1996, established that rewards may be paid 
out for information on criminal and civil violations.95 The bill also clarified 
that the rewards were to be paid out of proceeds collected as a result of the 
information disclosed, and that an annual report of the program was also 
required.96 However, that legislation did not explain how “proceeds 
collected” was defined for purposes of determining the amount of 
whistleblower awards. 
In 2006, the IRS published an Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 
clarifying that tax crimes include violations of criminal statutes of Title 26, 
Title 18 and/or Title 31 as applicable to Title 26.97 Despite this guidance 
 
amount can be deposited into the fund was lifted, therefore, all of the penalties and fines 
collected were allowed to be deposited to support crime victims. A few years later, in Fiscal 
year 2000, Congress limited the amount of funds available for distribution as a precaution to 
maintain a stable source of support for victims. Since its inception, the Crime Victims Fund 
has accumulated billions of dollars from penalties and fines. 
 93. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports. 
 94. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports. 
 95. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, 104 H.R. 506.; Jeffrey Neiman, Whistleblowers to Get a 
Larger Cut of IRS Recouped Taxes, LAW360 EXPERT ANALYSIS (2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1029447/whistleblowers-to-get-a-larger-cut-of-irs-
recouped-taxes. 
 96. Neiman, supra note 95.  
 97. IRM 9.5.3.1 (2006), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-
003#idm140538254164048. 
  
Summer 2021] TAX TATTLETALES HIT THE JACKPOT 103 
manual, the IRS commissioner took the position that proceeds only included 
amounts collected under Title 26.98 
In 2011, the Treasury proposed regulations (“Proposed Regulations 
I”) under Section 7623 to define “collected proceeds” as follows: 
Tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional 
amounts collected by reason of the information provided; 
amounts collected prior to receipt of the information if the 
information provided results in the denial of a claim for 
refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction 
of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax 
liability incurred because of the information provided.99 
On February 22, 2012, the Proposed Regulations I were finalized largely as 
proposed.100 Accordingly, in 2012, the IRS published an IRM modifying the 
definition of proceeds to comply with these regulations for the purposes of 
applying to the IRC sections 7623(a) and 7623(b).101 
On December 28, 2012, the Treasury proposed regulations 
(“Proposed Regulations II”) that built on the definition of collected proceeds 
specified in the final regulations published earlier in 2012.102 In addition to 
restating the definition of proceeds from these final regulations, the Proposed 
Regulations II provided that criminal fines deposited into the Victims of 
Crime Fund are not part of the “collected proceeds.”103 Comments were 
received in response to the Proposed Regulations II requesting the inclusion 
of amounts recovered under Title 18 and Title 31 in the proceeds collected 
to incentivize whistleblowers to disclose information on violations under 
 
 98. Neiman, supra note 95. Critics argue that the exclusion of civil and criminal violations 
from collected proceeds undermines IRS’ own directives. The separation of Title 26 from 
other titles without basis dissuades informants from exposing fraudulent activities. 
 99. Rewards and Awards for Information Relating to Violations of Internal Revenue Laws, 
76 Fed. Reg. 2852 (proposed Jan. 14, 2011), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/01/18/2011-928/rewards-and-awards-for-
information-relating-to-violations-of-internal-revenue-laws. 
 100. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(g) (2012). pmbl., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/02/22/2012-3989/rewards-and-awards-for-
information-relating-to-violations-of-internal-revenue-laws. 
 101. IRM 25.2.2.13 (2012). Note that the IRS originally interpreted proceeds to be “monies 
the IRS obtains directly from a taxpayer which are based upon the information the 
whistleblower has provided. 
 102. Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations of 
the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. 74798 (proposed Dec. 14, 2012), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/12/18/2012-30512/awards-for-
information-relating-to-detecting-underpayments-of-tax-or-violations-of-the-internal. 
 103. Id. 
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these titles.104 However, when the Proposed Regulations II were finalized on 
August 12, 2014, these final regulations provided that non-Title 26 amounts 
did not constitute collected proceeds since the language of the IRC section 
7623 only permits awards for detecting violations of the IRC and 
underpayments of tax.105 The final regulations also provided that the criminal 
fines deposited into the Victims of Crime Fund should not be considered 
collected proceeds.106 
Consistent with the 2012 final regulations, the 2014 final regulation 
Section 301.7623-2(d) defined “collected proceeds” as follows: 
Tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional 
amounts collected because of the information provided; 
amounts collected prior to receipt of the information if the 
information provided results in the denial of a claim for 
refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction 
of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax 
liability incurred because of the information provided. 
Collected proceeds are limited to amounts collected under 
the provisions of title 26, United States Code.107 
Because the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 requires the entire sum 
of fines collected in criminal tax cases to be deposited into the Victims of 
Crime Fund, the Treasury regulations retained the rule requiring these fines 
to be deposited into the Victims of Crime Fund.108 These amounts did not 
constitute collected proceeds.109 At this point, the definition of collected 
proceeds was narrow. It did not include criminal fines and civil forfeitures 
that were collected under both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims. The 
regulations providing guidance on information submitted concerning tax 
underpayments or violations of the IRC have not changed since 2014. 
2. Uproar in the Courtroom: Judiciary Interprets Proceeds 
Controversy over the definition of collected proceeds arose in court 
cases related to a whistleblower claim originally filed in 2015.110 In the first 
 
 104. TREAS. REG. § 301.7623-2 (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/08/12/2014-18858/awards-for-
information-relating-to-detecting-underpayments-of-tax-or-violations-of-the-internal. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. TREAS. REG. § 301.7623-2(d) (Aug. 14, 2014). 
 108. See TREAS. REG. § 301.7623-2 (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/08/12/2014-18858/awards-for-
information-relating-to-detecting-underpayments-of-tax-or-violations-of-the-internal. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Whistleblower 21276-13W v. C.I.R., 144 T.C. 290, 291 (2015) [hereinafter 
Whistleblower I]. 
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case, Whistleblower I, petitioners, husband and wife, helped the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) stage a sting operation to get incriminating evidence against 
the businesses involved in tax evasion (“targeted businesses”).111 The 
targeted businesses were found guilty of conspiring to commit offense and 
defraud of the IRS in violation of Title 18.112 A defendant found guilty of an 
offense may be required to pay a criminal fine for filing false tax returns, 
evading income taxes, and conspiring to defraud the IRS; in this case, the 
targeted businesses were sentenced to pay $22,050,000 in criminal fines.113 
Civil forfeitures constitute forfeiture of property used in a transaction (i.e., 
money laundering) with the intent to evade taxes or file false tax returns; in 
this case, the targeted businesses were sentenced to pay $15,821,000 in civil 
forfeitures.114 Overall, the targeted businesses were required to pay over $74 
million in tax restitution, criminal fines and civil forfeitures.115 When 
petitioners filed Form 211 with the WO seeking awards for their 
contributions to the IRS’s investigation, multiple disputes ensued.116 
Whistleblower I resolved the first disputed issue, holding that petitioners did 
not have to file Form 211 before disclosing information to the IRS to qualify 
for an award.117 
In 2016, the second case, Whistleblower II, focused on the second 
dispute regarding the definition of proceeds. This case posed the question 
whether criminal fines and civil forfeitures were part of the collected 
proceeds for the purposes of the whistleblower award.118 Reading the words 
“collected proceeds” within the context of the statute and interpreting them 
by their plain meaning, the court found that  criminal fines and civil 
forfeitures constituted collected proceeds.119 The court concluded that if 
Congress had intended to limit proceeds to Title 26, it would have explicitly 
done so.120 The court also pointed out that the IRC itself refers to laws outside 
of Title 26.121 By holding that criminal fines and civil forfeitures are 
collected proceeds, which are not limited to Title 26, the judiciary introduced 
an expansive interpretation of collected proceeds.122 
 
 111. Id. at 293–95. 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2020); Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. 121, 122 (2016). 
 113. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123; 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 3571 (2020). 
 114. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123; 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (2016). 
 115. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123. 
 116. Whistleblower I, 144 T.C. at 290. 
 117. Whistleblower I, 144 T.C. at 300. 
 118. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123. 
 119. Id. at 136, 138. 
 120. Id. at 130. 
 121. Id. at 131. 
 122. Id. at 136, 138. 
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3. Legislative Follows Judicial: Congress Defines Collected Proceeds 
On February 9, 2018, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act 
(BBA) of 2018, and among many other changes, this law amended the 
definition of “proceeds” for purposes of the determination of whistleblower 
awards.123 The revised definition, adopted in response to the Whistleblower 
I and II litigation and lobbying, defined “proceeds” broadly to not only 
include “penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts 
provided under the internal revenue laws,” but to also include criminal fines, 
civil forfeitures and penalties arising out of the violations of reporting 
requirements.124 As a result of the amendments made by the BBA, the IRC 
section 7623(c) now reads: 
For purposes of this section, the term ‘proceeds’ includes – 
(1) Penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional 
amounts provided under the internal revenue laws, and 
(2) any proceeds arising from laws for which the Internal 
Revenue is authorized to administer, enforce, or investigate, 
including – 
(A) criminal fines and civil forfeitures, and 
(B) violations of reporting requirements.125 
While the judicial decision held that the civil forfeitures and criminal 
fines constitute collected proceeds for awards paid out under Section 
7623(b), the revised statutory language broadened the definition of 
“proceeds” for awards paid out under both Sections 7623(a) and (b). In 
addition to adopting the court’s approach for Section 7623(b), Congress 
applied the same approach for Section 7623(a), which was not addressed by 
the court. Nevertheless, with the statutory revision and codification of the 
broad definition of proceeds, both the legislature and judicial branches were 
on board with the change. But what are the implications of this expansive 
definition of proceeds? 
III. BROAD DEFINITION OF “PROCEEDS COLLECTED” 
ADVANCES GOALS OF THE TAX WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM 
Recognizing that the tax whistleblower program was established as 
an external reporting mechanism allowing employees to report fraudulent 
activities to the government in exchange for a reward, the sections below 
discuss how the broad definition of proceeds advances the goals of the 
 
 123. BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT OF 2018, PUB. L. NO. 115-123, §132 STAT. 64, 158 (2018). 
 124. BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT OF 2018, PUB. L. NO. 115-123, §132 STAT. 64, 158 (2018); 
Neiman, supra note 95. 
 125. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(c) (2019). 
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whistleblower program and analyzes whether the broadened definition of 
proceeds promotes good tax policy more generally. 
A. Goals of the Whistleblower Program 
The goals of the tax whistleblower program are to incentivize 
whistleblowers to “blow the whistle,” thereby encouraging companies to 
develop internal reporting mechanisms to identify compliance problems and 
facilitating the IRS enforcements efforts to close the tax gap and increase 
federal revenue. The following subparts analyze whether the broadened 
definition of “proceeds collected” advances these objectives. 
1. Incentive to “Blow the Whistle” 
A larger monetary award can incentivize more employees to disclose 
insider information to external reporting programs.126 Studies have shown 
that a large monetary award (versus a small monetary award) is a stronger 
incentive,127 therefore, the IRS whistleblower program’s broad definition of 
proceeds encourages more employees to report externally. Admittedly, 
financial incentive is not likely to influence the decision of employees who 
are motivated primarily by a sense of duty. But the expectation of an award 
might influence these individuals to some extent, even if it is not the primary 
reason why they decide to blow the whistle. Regardless of the definition of 
proceeds, the whistleblower program incentivizes taxpayers to disclose tax 
violations. However, the prospect of a larger potential payout with the 
broader definition of proceeds incentivizes more employees to report to the 
IRS. Thus, the broad definition of proceeds, which increases the award 
payout, encourages more employees to report directly to the IRS. 
By offering a higher award payout, the broad definition of proceeds 
does more to encourage ex-spouses, former business partners, and even 
individuals facing criminal charges to report on others engaged in unlawful 
conduct.128 Unlike employee whistleblowers who are typically motivated by 
moral outrage or a sense of duty,129 ex-spouses and former business partners 
 
 126. Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s 
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 758 (2014). 
 127. Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World as We 
Know it, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty 
Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 1023, 1052 (2012). 
 128. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street 
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 141 (2012). 
 129. Alon Faiman, “No One Likes a Tattle Tale,” or Do they? Why the Implementation of a 
Broad Definition of “Collected Proceeds” Under the Tax Whistleblower Program is a Major 
Win for Whistleblowers and Taxpayers,” 12 CHARLESTON L. REV. 173, 209–10 (2018). 
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who report tax cheats may be “motivated by revenge.”130 Despite this self-
serving behavior, ex-spouses and disgruntled business partners still reveal 
useful information to the government.131 Similarly, individuals facing 
criminal charges will be incentivized to reveal insider information in 
exchange for an award.132 But these individuals are more likely to file false 
reports to escape criminal prosecution.133 To mitigate risks of such fraudulent 
reports, the WO has implemented steps to throw out meritless claims.134 The 
whistleblower statute also explicitly reduces or denies the award to 
individuals who either initiated the action that resulted in the underpayment 
of tax or were criminally convicted for planning such action.135 Consider, for 
instance, Bradley Birkenfeld, a former international banker, who was 
sentenced to 40 months in prison for his role in a tax evasion case even 
though he earned a $104 million whistleblower award.136 Although 
Birkenfeld received the largest whistleblower award paid by the IRS, he 
could not escape charges for fraud.137 
Despite their personal motives, ex-spouses, former business 
partners, and alleged criminals may have valuable information for the 
government. These individuals will reveal such information to the IRS 
regardless of the size of the monetary reward. It does not matter whether the 
definition of proceeds is broad or narrow for their purposes. However, the 
expectation of a larger reward will further incentivize them to snitch on those 
engaged in fraudulent activities. It is a win-win situation for them.  
2. Encourages Companies to Build Internal Compliance Mechanisms 
By incentivizing more individuals to reveal tax fraud with a larger 
payout, the broad definition of proceeds encourages companies to develop 
internal reporting mechanisms to identify compliance problems. By 
protecting and rewarding individuals, whistleblower laws present risks that 
are “too large for all entities, even the smallest, to ignore.”138 As a 
consequence, organizations have established internal reporting mechanisms 
 
 130. Ladwig, infra note 140, at 90. 
131 Rapp, supra note 128. 
 132. Jennifer M. Pacella, Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable Whistleblowers 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act and Internal Revenue Code, 17 U. PA. J BUS. L. 345, 372 (2015). 
 133. Id. at 372. 
 134. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 136. Debra S. Katz, Emerging Issues in Whistleblower Law and Retaliation, PRAC. LA. 37, 
50 (2017). 
 137. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., NY TIMES (Sept. 
11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/whistle-blower-awarded-104-
million-by-irs.html. 
 138. Patrick S. Coffey, Managing the Threat of Whistleblower Claims, WIS. LAW. 30, 30 
(2015). 
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to address workplace concerns.139 Because employees who “blow the 
whistle” are usually motivated by a sense of moral duty, they feel obligated 
to report internally to preserve the employer-employee relationship.140 With 
the recent implementation of retaliatory protection under the Taxpayer First 
Act, prohibiting employers from discharging, harassing, demoting, 
suspending, or discriminating against an employee who lawfully discloses 
information to the government or employer about underpayment of taxes or 
violations of the internal revenue laws, employees are even more likely to 
report to the internal compliance program.141 However, employers who still 
retaliate by seeking revenge or striking back at the employee for complaining 
about the alleged illegal act might push employees to file claims with the 
WO.142 Employees are essentially committing a “career suicide” and 
forgoing career opportunities143 when fraud is spread throughout the 
corporation and “information is not . . . well received or acted upon.”144 With 
the broadened definition of proceeds promising a larger award in exchange 
for information on illegal acts, the companies fear more disclosures of tax 
fraud and will feel more pressure to investigate fraudulent misconduct. The 
threat that misconduct could be revealed to the government will increase 
compliant behavior. Internal compliance issues might even be rectified 
without the need for an IRS enforcement action. 
3. Facilitating IRS Enforcement Efforts 
The broad definition of “proceeds” aids the IRS in enforcing 
compliance. In the past decade, the IRS funding has been cut by at least 
twenty-five percent.145 This has resulted in reduced tax enforcement—the 
“number of individual audits fell forty-two percent between 2010 and 
2017.”146 With the growing workload and limited resources, the IRS has been 
unable to “detect and address noncompliance” and “maximize revenue 
collection.”147 Regardless of whether proceeds are defined narrowly or 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Christine A. Ladwig, A Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Triple Win Scenario: The 
Joint Benefit of an Internal-External Reporting Alliance for Corporations, Whistleblowers 
and Government, 27 MIDWEST L.J. 79, 87 (2017). 
 141. Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, 133 Stat. 981, 998–99 (2019). President Trump 
signed the Taxpayer First Act providing protection from retaliation in July of 2019. 
 142. Patricia A. Wise, Understanding and Preventing Workplace Retaliation, Chapter 1: 
Defining Retaliation in the Workplace (2004). 
 143. Pacella, supra note 126, at 754. 
 144. Ladwig, supra note 140, at 89. 
 145. Scott Horsley, On Tax Day, The IRS is Short of Money, NPR (April 15, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/15/713411490/on-tax-day-the-irs-is-short-of-money. 
 146. Id. 
 147. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, at 3 (2011) 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/irs_tas_arc_2011_vol_1.pdf. 
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broadly, the whistleblower program encourages informants to provide 
information to the IRS, making it easier for the agency to detect 
noncompliance and target noncompliant taxpayers. But the incentive of a 
larger award will attract more whistleblowers, allowing the IRS to discover 
more noncompliance and investigate more fraudulent activities that would 
otherwise go undetected. In sum, the broader definition of “proceeds” offers 
a larger award, which encourages more taxpayers to aid the IRS, thereby 
providing more assistance for the IRS’s efforts to reduce noncompliance and 
tax fraud. 
4. Closing the Tax Gap and Increasing the Federal Revenue 
By doing more to improve the IRS enforcement efforts and 
encourage increased compliance, the broad definition of proceeds minimizes 
the gap between tax paid and tax owed,148 thereby increasing the federal 
revenue. The IRS has estimated the annual tax gap to be somewhere between 
$400–500 billion.149 By offering a larger monetary prize, the IRS encourages 
more whistleblowers to come forward with information that the IRS might 
otherwise not have detected with its limited resources.150 By pursuing more 
noncompliant taxpayers and operating as a deterrence for tax fraud, the 
whistleblower program can close the tax gap even more.151 This reduction in 
the size of the tax gap results in more revenue collected. The whistleblower 
program helps the government collect more of the money owed by taxpayers, 
and when the government collects a larger percentage of the money owed as 
a result of a broader definition of proceeds that incentivizes more taxpayers 
to blow the whistle, the government is better able to do whatever it 
determines is necessary. 
Larger money payouts, as a result of the broad definition of proceeds 
for the purposes of determining the award, do not deplete the collected 
taxes.152 Although the whistleblower program may cost government more 
money in an individual case by offering as much as thirty percent of the total 
collected proceeds in awards, bigger award payouts encourage more 
whistleblowers to come forward, resulting in the discovery of more 
noncompliant taxpayers. This results in more whistleblower cases; therefore, 
larger awards lead to more tax collections in the aggregate even if each case 
ends up bringing in slightly less money. The revelation of more information 
to the IRS will also reduce the agency’s costs of detecting noncompliance. 
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The IRS may have to pay a larger sum to the whistleblower as an award, but 
it simultaneously saves money spent on the detection of noncompliance. 
Thus, the broad definition of proceeds allows the IRS to detect more 
noncompliance, increasing overall revenue collected. 
B. Broad Definition of Proceeds Promotes Tax Policy Norms 
The preceding section establishes how the broad definition of 
proceeds increases the efficacy of the tax whistleblower program. But how 
does the broad definition of proceeds affect the goals of the tax system? The 
primary purpose of the tax system is to “facilitate the collection of revenue” 
to ensure stability in “the nation’s fiscal health and its social well being.”153 
To further evaluate whether the broad definition of proceeds is a good public 
policy that advances the objectives of the tax system, three tax policy norms–
neutrality, fairness, and simplicity–are discussed below.154 
1. Deviation from Neutrality is Inevitable 
The broad definition of proceeds promotes the goals of the 
whistleblower program by changing the behavior of taxpayers; hence, non-
neutrality is inevitable. The tax system maintains neutrality by ensuring that 
tax considerations do not drive economic decisions of taxpayers.155 The 
objective is to raise revenue for government spending and promote economic 
growth without distorting the behavior of taxpayers.156 Yet the whistleblower 
program, even with a narrow definition of proceeds, incentivizes 
whistleblowers to report underpayments of tax and violations of the internal 
revenue code. It promotes the goals of the tax system by facilitating revenue 
collection and raising federal revenue. However, the expectation of a larger 
award as a result of a broader definition of proceeds incentivizes taxpayers 
who were previously not incentivized to disclose noncompliance. Fearing 
this surge in disclosure of unlawful misconduct, previously noncompliant 
taxpayers will be more inclined to pay all the taxes owed rather than face a 
government action or investigation. Such distortions in behavior lessen 
neutrality in the tax system. However, this deviation from a neutral tax 
system does promote a good public policy. 
Neutrality is a non-issue if the goal of the policymakers is to create 
positive externalities by changing the behavior of taxpayers. As mentioned 
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above, the expanded interpretation of proceeds encourages more taxpayers 
to blow the whistle and reveal fraudulent misconduct to the government, 
thereby increasing compliance. This distortion in the behavior of taxpayers 
leaves the government better-off. With the aid of whistleblowers, the 
government can recover unpaid taxes and raise revenue for its spending. The 
government will have additional funds to invest in social welfare, advancing 
a good public policy. Therefore, any additional deviation from neutrality 
with the expanded definition of proceeds is justified in light of the increased 
well-being of society. 
2. Improvement in Tax Fairness Norms 
The new definition of “proceeds collected” is a fair tax policy even 
if it deviates from a neutral tax system. The tax fairness principle consists of 
two norms: vertical and horizontal equity.157 Vertical equity requires tax 
obligations to be proportional to income.158 Horizontal equity ascertains that 
two alike taxpayers in a similar situation have the same tax liabilities.159 
Regardless of the definition of “proceeds collected” for the purposes of 
determining the whistleblower award, the tax whistleblower program detects 
underpayments of taxes and ensures that taxpayers bear their share of the tax 
burden. For example, if an informant discloses the unlawful acts of wealthy 
individuals who underpay their taxes, then the whistleblower program can 
require them to pay tax restitution, criminal fines and civil forfeitures. The 
whistleblower program prevents wealthy individuals from undermining the 
progressivity of the system. By requiring such taxpayers to carry a larger 
burden, the program attempts to achieve fairness via vertical equity.160 
Similarly, if a taxpayer who carries the same tax burden as another underpays 
her taxes, then the program can impose penalties and fines to reach fairness 
by way of horizontal equity. With the recent change in the definition of 
proceeds to include criminal fines and civil forfeitures, the whistleblower 
program can increase fairness in the tax system. By offering a larger financial 
incentive, the program can attract more whistleblowers and target more 
taxpayers engaged in illegal conduct. By facilitating the IRS’s enforcement 
efforts, the program can prevent more taxpayers from unfairly paying less 
than their share of burden and reduce the tax gap, advancing fairness in the 
tax system. 
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3. Simplification Adds More Complexity 
The IRC section 7623(c) clarifies the definition of proceeds for the 
purposes of determining the whistleblower award, but it also adds to the 
complexity of the law. Tax policy should be simple.161 Along with being 
easily enforceable, it should “avoid excessive complexity.”162 A clear 
definition of proceeds, regardless of whether it is narrow or broad, simplifies 
the application of the whistleblower statute. Congress put an end to the 
differing interpretations of the term with the explicit inclusion of criminal 
fines, civil forfeitures and penalties for the violations of reporting 
requirements in the total proceeds collected. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
both Title 26 and non-Title 26 fines and penalties adds a layer of complexity. 
Leaving the WO to figure out how to calculate the awards with both 
Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims, the new definition of proceeds causes 
complexity in the whistleblower program. Before 2018, the IRS simply 
closed claims with no “Title 26 Collected Proceeds.”163 After the 2018 
amendments, the IRS had to keep such claims open in the event non-Title 26 
amounts were collected, resulting in the issuance of a whistleblower award. 
For example, in 2018, the WO undertook the review of “29,198 open claims 
for potential non-Title 26 proceeds.”164 Reviewing Title 26 and non-Title 26 
claims individually delayed the claims process, as proceeds were probably 
collected at different times. Therefore, in 2019, as a response to the BBA of 
2018, the WO modified Form 11369.165 Each taxpayer involved in the 
investigation of the whistleblower’s claim was required to submit Form 
11369, along with a narrative, to assist the WO in determining the extent of 
the contributions made by the whistleblower’s information.166 The narrative 
specifically provides details on “how the whistleblower’s information was 
used in any IRS investigation; regardless of whether the laws administered, 
enforced, or investigated are outside of Title 26.”167 Because the WO makes 
 
 161. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 1267 (1990). 
 162. Id. 
 163. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 17 
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2018.pdf. 
 164. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 6 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2019.pdf. 
 165. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 6 (2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2020.pdf 
 166. I.R.M. 25.2.1.5.5 (April 29, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-002-
001#idm140291679327216. Taxpayers affected by the IRS investigation “are relevant to a 
whistleblower submission when: (a) the whistleblower identifies the taxpayers in the claim; 
or (b) the whistleblower information is considered in a civil, criminal, or judicial proceeding 
involving a taxpayer other than the taxpayer(s) identified in the claim(s).” 
 167. Id. 
  
114 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:2 
an award determination upon the receipt of Form 11369,168 it can potentially 
review both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims simultaneously. Examining 
whether the modifications in Form 11369 have reduced the complexity of 
the new procedure (requiring the WO to evaluate both Title 26 and non-Title 
26 claims) is beyond the scope of this note. But these updates in the 
whistleblower claims process demonstrate the impact of the broader 
definition of proceeds. Amending its procedures to reflect the changes in the 
law, the WO is attempting to maintain a simple tax system. Since this is a 
new practice, there is not enough data to determine whether the WO has been 
successful in evaluating both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims for award 
determinations. 
*** 
Given the foregoing discussion, the broad definition of proceeds 
contributes to the goals of the whistleblower program and attempts to 
advance the tax policy norms to a certain degree. However, the broad 
definition of proceeds purely on its own is not enough to reach the full 
potential of the whistleblower program. 
IV. EXPANDING DEFINITION OF PROCEEDS IS PROGRESS 
BUT NOT ENOUGH 
The new definition of proceeds increases the impact of the 
whistleblower program; however, it also reveals certain issues that cannot be 
resolved with a mere financial incentive. To comprehensively advance the 
goals of the whistleblower program, additional steps must be taken to create 
appropriate incentives for whistleblowers influenced by non-monetary 
motivations and companies with ineffective internal compliance 
mechanisms. 
A. More Should be Done to Incentivize Whistleblowers and Encourage 
Compliance 
1. Addressing Heterogeneous Motivations 
The expanded definition of proceeds does not respond to 
heterogeneous motivations. It incentivizes informants who are entirely, or at 
least partly motivated by money. Such individuals may be employees, ex-
spouses, former business partners, or alleged criminals.169 These same 
individuals might still have other motivations–sense of duty, moral outrage, 
revenge, or higher likelihood of escaping criminal prosecution.170 Therefore, 
prospective whistleblowers, especially employees who feel obligated to 
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disclose noncompliance out of a sense of duty, need more than just a 
financial incentive. They are certainly swayed by the monetary award,171 
even if just slightly, but another non-monetary benefit might give them the 
final push to reach out to the IRS whistleblower program. Rather than 
reporting to potentially inadequate internal compliance programs, these 
informants will reach out to the external whistleblower program. Thus, tax 
policymakers need to implement additional incentives to attract 
whistleblowers with heterogeneous motivations in order to detect more 
noncompliance. 
2. Improving Internal Compliance Mechanisms 
The threat of whistleblower programs has prompted companies to 
establish internal compliance mechanisms,172 however, their effectiveness is 
questionable. Companies with widespread fraud might retaliate against 
employees and not act upon the reported information.173 Internal reporting 
might be entirely ineffective if the corporate authorities conduct no 
investigation whatsoever.174 Admittedly, whistleblowers can report to an 
external reporting program when internal reporting fails or is “not an 
option.”175 But this will deplete the IRS’s limited resources and funding.176 
Therefore, the tax whistleblower program needs to enact a policy that forces 
these companies to implement an effective internal compliance program. If 
internal reporting compliance programs are reliable, the whistleblower 
program will no longer need to expend its resources on corporate non-
compliance. With companies rectifying internal problems, the whistleblower 
programs can reduce the tax gap even more and raise revenue. As of right 
now, the tax whistleblower program prompts companies to establish an 
internal reporting mechanism, but it needs to push these companies to 
conduct investigations and actually mitigate fraud. 
B. Recommendations to Further Goals of the Tax Whistleblower 
Program 
1. Responding to Heterogeneous Motivations: Education and Praise 
Education can incentivize taxpayers with heterogeneous motivations 
to reveal tax fraud. The notion of tax morale, also known as “internal 
motivations,” is often used to depict how “tax compliance is affected by 
(social and personal) norms such as those regarding procedural justice, trust, 
 
 171. Pacella, supra note 132. 
 172. See supra notes 138, 140. 
 173. Ladwig, supra note 140. 
 174. Id. at 89–90. 
 175. Id. at 89. 
 176. See supra note 145–147. 
  
116 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:2 
belief in the legitimacy of the government, reciprocity, altruism, and 
identification with the group.”177 Making taxpayers feel more in “control of 
their tax situation,” education heightens tax morale by “strengthening 
feelings of identity, reciprocity, fairness, [and] procedural justice.” 178 
Educating taxpayers about the impact of the tax whistleblower program on 
the tax gap and federal revenue is one way to encourage them to disclose tax 
violations. The IRS can work with tax experts to spread knowledge, create 
teaching programs via educational institutions, or publish articles on its 
website.179￼ Through communication, the IRS can inform the public about 
the contributions of the whistleblower program to social welfare. It can 
emphasize on the role of whistleblowers in raising revenue, which ultimately 
helps the country and its citizens. With the collection of more taxes, the 
government can use funds where they are deemed necessary, and even 
eventually lower tax rates. Understanding that there is more to the 
whistleblower program than just a monetary award, taxpayers will be more 
inclined to snitch on others to strengthen fairness and procedural justice. 
Prospective whistleblowers, with knowledge of the program, will 
feel obliged to report to the IRS. Prompting taxpayers to disclose tax 
violations has been a challenge for the whistleblower program. Merely 
having knowledge about the social impact of the whistleblower program 
might not be sufficient to encourage individuals to disclose information 
about their personal or professional connections. But higher education 
correlates with higher tax morale.180 Therefore, education heightens internal 
motivation of prospective whistleblowers to aid the government in 
improving the country. All in all, education is a significant tool that urges 
individuals with heterogeneous motivations to reveal tax violations. 
Praise is another method that can mitigate the impact of 
heterogeneous motivations on the behavior of prospective whistleblowers. 
Praise is an indication of approval.181 Tax policymakers use praise by 
providing a positive incentive,182 in the form of a financial award, to 
whistleblowers. This incentive is given out to encourage more taxpayers to 
file whistleblower claims with the IRS. It “increases a certain kind of 
behavior.”183 It is distinguishable from a reward that is also given out as a 
result of certain behavior, but only if the recipient “deserves to receive it.”184 
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The IRS should use incentive and reward payouts congruently. In addition 
to offering the money payment, it should distribute rewards to 
whistleblowers in the form of a “praise” to show that they are deserving 
recipients. Legal praise is valuable.185 In military, medals are given to 
soldiers for acts of valor.186 This form of praise has substantial effect on 
soldiers because it encourages them to act gallantly in future.187 Similarly, 
the IRS can single out whistleblowers for contributing to social welfare and 
treat them as heroes. Openly praising whistleblowers on the IRS website, in 
published articles and even in news media, the IRS can turn the spotlight on 
the contributions made by these individuals in minimizing tax gap and 
raising revenue for the betterment of society. Because society respects heroes 
for having a good moral character,188 public will be more accepting of 
whistleblowers if they are considered heroes. Given this public acceptance, 
prospective whistleblowers will feel more inclined to report tax fraud to the 
IRS without being treated as “snitches.” 
The whistleblower award might cheapen the notion of heroism.189 
Money payments are external incentives that can certainly diminish internal 
motivation of taxpayers to behave a certain way.190 It changes the behavior 
of individuals who are entirely or partly motivated by money. But it does 
compensate those who jeopardize their career by disclosing fraud.191 
Employees who lose their jobs might still be able to maintain financial 
stability with this award. On the other hand, in cases where individuals have 
heterogeneous motivations, it might not be enough to convince them to 
disclose tax violations to the IRS. These individuals might want money, but 
are probably afraid to jeopardize their career or incite public backlash.192 Or 
they are simply more motivated by sense of duty and moral outrage.193 In 
these situations, praise is a tool that can encourage individuals to reach out 
to the IRS. Praise is more “likely to imply an acknowledgement of intrinsic 
motivation” with its recognition of good behavior.194 Whistleblowers will 
overlook the concerns mentioned above if they are treated as heroes. 
Therefore, money is as important as praise when it comes to incentivizing 
and rewarding whistleblowers. Similar to how Good Samaritan laws inject 
financial incentive (lower risk of tort liability) and promote voluntary 
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heroism,195 the whistleblower award can compensate whistleblowers for 
jeopardizing their career and praise them for reporting tax fraud. Prospective 
whistleblowers are putting a lot at stake and risking personal and 
professional relationships; thus, these individuals should be praised for their 
courage regardless of the monetary award. 
2. Improving Internal Compliance Mechanisms: Penalties 
Penalties force taxpayers to comply with tax law,196 so the IRS 
should impose penalties on companies with ineffective internal reporting 
programs. Taxpayers abide by the law when legal sanctions cost more than 
compliance.197 Legal sanctions, by way of civil and criminal penalties, 
promote compliance.198 Reviewing the impact of different forms of penalties 
is beyond the scope of this note. But the possibility of a penalty that is costlier 
than compliance will drive these companies to establish an effective internal 
reporting mechanism. Since most whistleblowers are intrinsically motivated 
by a sense of duty, they will choose the effective internal reporting 
mechanism (if available) over an external whistleblower program.199 
Therefore, to ensure that employee complaints are effectively investigated 
and rectified, the whistleblower program should specifically impose 
penalties on companies with unreliable internal reporting structures. 
If an internal risk management structure is more costly than 
compliance, then companies might prefer to pay tax penalties. But this 
strategy can jeopardize a company’s public image. Legal action for 
noncompliance comes with negative publicity.200 Putting company’s 
reputation at stake, legal penalties can cause more than just monetary 
damage. Therefore, penalties are a valuable tool. The IRS should consider 
imposing penalties on companies with inadequate internal reporting 
mechanisms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The new definition of proceeds, including criminal fines and civil 
forfeitures, advances the goals of the tax whistleblower program. By 
incentivizing whistleblowers to disclose unlawful activities committed by 
taxpayers in exchange for a substantial financial gain, the whistleblower 
program is aiding the IRS with its enforcement actions, thereby helping to 
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close the tax gap and raise federal revenue. After the Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2018, the whistleblower award is determined based on total proceeds 
collected (i.e., including criminal fines and civil forfeitures), increasing the 
amount of award. The prospect of a significant monetary payment has 
incentivized more taxpayers to reveal tax violations to the IRS. Fearing 
increased disclosures, companies have built internal compliance 
mechanisms even if the effectiveness of these internal risk management 
structures is questionable. With more taxpayers partaking in the 
whistleblower program, the IRS can detect and address more non-
compliance, raising more revenue. 
The expanded definition of proceeds affects tax policy norms. The 
new definition of proceeds changes the behavior of taxpayer by incentivizing 
them to disclose tax fraud in exchange for a larger sum of money. This 
deviation from tax neutrality is justified given the contributions of the 
whistleblower program in advancing social good. Having more 
whistleblowers aid the IRS in ensuring that taxpayers carry their share of tax 
burden, the new definition of proceeds attempts to promote tax fairness. It, 
however, does add complexity to the whistleblower program by requiring 
the WO to review both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims. 
Because the definition of proceeds on its own cannot address certain 
problems, the whistleblower program needs to take additional steps to 
increase its effectiveness. This note raises two issues that cannot be rectified 
with a change in the definition of proceeds: incentivizing prospective 
whistleblowers with heterogeneous motivations and encouraging companies 
to maintain an effective internal reporting mechanism. This note provides 
some direction for the whistleblower program to devise strategies that can 
continue to develop and expand its efficacy. However, additional research 
and analysis is necessary for the development of these proposals. 
 
 
